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THAWING OUT THE "COLD RECORD": SOME
THOUGHTS ON HOW VIDEOTAPED RECORDS MAY
AFFECT TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF DEFERENCE
ON DIRECT AND COLLATERAL REVIEW
Robert C. Owen* and Melissa Mather**
The "coldness" of the written record of any trial has long
provided the justification (or scapegoat, depending on one's
point of view) for the deference appellate courts pay to the
rulings of their colleagues on the trial bench.' Reviewing judges,
as they affirm discretionary decisions by lower courts, routinely
recite their inability to second-guess the accuracy of the trial
court's conclusion, given that only the trial judge actually
* Schonemann, Rountree & Owen, L.L.P., Austin, Texas; Adjunct Professor and Co-
Director, Capital Punishment Clinic, University of Texas School of Law; J.D. 1989,
Harvard Law School.
** Lankler, Siffert & Wohl, L.L.P., New York, New York; law clerk to the Honorable
Emilio M. Garza, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1997-98; J.D. 1997,
University of Virginia School of Law.
1. E.g. Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp. v. New York C.R. Co., 126 F.2d 992,
994-95 (2d Cir. 1942) (L. Hand, J.) (noting that "it is not important how we should have
decided the issue on the cold record and without the benefit of the judge's finding"
because "decisions [are] legion that when a judge ha[s] seen and heard the witnesses his
conclusions [will] prevail unless clearly wrong").
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 2000)
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
"smell[ed] the smoke of the battle." 2 To hear the appellate
courts tell it, they cannot hope to compete with the trial court's
careful scrutiny of the demeanor of the witnesses and its
attentive monitoring of the complex interplay among jury,
witness, court, and counsel.3
Perhaps even before the advent of reliable and cheap
videotaping technology, those familiar arguments might have
been fairly open to skepticism. Now, of course, trial court
proceedings can be, and with increasing frequency are, captured
on videotape.4 Video technology refutes the rhetoric of necessity
that has long been invoked to defend traditional standards of
appellate court deference to trial court decisionmaking.
Appellate courts, if they so choose, now can have access via
video to the same "data" that presumably inform the
discretionary decisions of trial judges, and that were heretofore
impossible to examine on appeal. The advent of video
technology makes de novo appellate review of such trial court
rulings a real possibility for the first time.
The indications thus far, however, are that appellate courts,
notwithstanding the availability of videotaped trial records and
trial evidence, are extremely reluctant to take advantage of this
newly available technology to evaluate, for example, witness
credibility, in the course of considering an appeal. In some
cases, appellate judges have refused even to watch available
videotapes of disputed events, insisting that only the traditional
"cold" record permits reasoned decisionmaking. Some judges,
indeed, appear to think it dangerous even to consider reviewing
the trial "as it happened," as if the prospect of exercising more
substantive oversight somehow imperils the legitimacy of the
2. Gavin v. State, 473 S.2d 952, 955 (Miss. 1985) ("[Elven if we wanted to be fact
finders, our capacity for such is limited in that we have only a cold, printed record to
review. The trial judge who hears the witnesses live, observes their demeanor and in
general smells the smoke of the battle is by his very position far better equipped to make
findings of fact which will have the reliability that we need and desire.").
3. See Purvis v. Dugger, 932 F.2d 1413, 1419 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the
"unique position" of the state trial court to determine fact-sensitive issues "after observing
[the defendant] and listening to the evidence presented at trial").
4. See Georgi-Ann Oshagan, Student Author, Videotaped Trial Transcripts and
Appellate Review: Are Some Courts Favoring Form Over Substance? 38 Wayne L. Rev.
1639, 1639-43 (1992) (discussing videotape transcription projects in Kentucky, Michigan,
New Jersey, and North Carolina).
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whole enterprise of appellate review.'
The appellate courts' reaction to this technological change
raises important questions about the traditional standards of
appellate deference to trial court decisionmaking. Given the
advances in video technology, studying and assessing the
demeanor of witnesses, lawyers, and jurors are no longer the
exclusive province of the trial court. Yet the appellate standard
of deference has never been (solely) the regrettable, but
necessary, consequence of technological constraints. Instead,
deference represents a deliberate political/institutional choice-a
preference for finality and economy, even at the possible
expense of accuracy. Nothing demonstrates this point more
clearly than the appellate courts' uncomfortable reaction to
videotaped records and evidence. Even when the presumed
factual barriers to substantive oversight are removed, reviewing
courts continue to emphasize the importance of deferring to
discretionary decisions rendered below.
In our view, if appellate courts are to continue applying
those standards of deference even in the face of technological
changes that make them unnecessary, the courts should come
clean about the political choices such practices represent. Once
we understand the policies behind deferring to trial courts, we
can evaluate the institutional concerns at stake without fearing a
technology that might actually make the reviewing court's job
easier and increase the accuracy of certain determinations on
appeal. In contexts where more careful oversight makes sense as
a constitutional matter (such as review of death penalty cases, as
discussed below), we can use available video technology to
exercise that oversight as accurately as possible. Where greater
deference makes sense as an institutional matter (as in direct
5. E.g. Moustakas v. Dashevsky, 25 Cal. App. 4th 752, 754-55 (Cal. App. 1994)
(refusing to consider a videotape of the trial court proceedings as "part of the record on...
appeal" because "drastic change in the principles of appellate review would be needed
before we could base our decisions on appeal on our own evaluation of the sights and
sounds of the trial courtroom"); Shillington v. K-Mart Corp., 402 S.E.2d 155, 157 (N.C.
App. 1991) (commenting negatively on a state rule permitting appellants to submit only a
videotape transcript for the record on appeal and encouraging "appellants to submit, from
the outset, a written transcript of the entire proceedings," because "[a]lthough there may
be many substantial benefits in videotaping trial proceedings, it is our opinion that the use
of videotapes in this Court for appellate review greatly frustrates effective review of the
trial proceedings," and the "time needed to adequately review the evidence is greatly
enlarged," particularly when "questions of sufficiency of the evidence are determinative").
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appeals of routine civil cases), courts can justify the exercise of
that deference honestly-by invoking values such as finality and
judicial economy, rather than hiding behind no-longer-existent
factual limitations.
I. VIDEOTAPE RECORDS ON DIRECT REVIEW
A. Justifying Deference Without Reference to Necessity
Present the same case to two different fact-finders, and
each may render a different verdict. The reasons for this
observable effect are varied. Many matters that the law defines
as questions of fact, such as whether an actor possessed a given
mental state, are impossible to establish with mathematical
precision. Even less ineffable disputes-whether a traffic light
was red or green-may turn entirely on the credibility of
witnesses, which is simply another way of saying that they will
depend on characteristics of the fact-finder as well as the
witness. Even assuming that "we are all realists now," 6 such
arbitrariness is disturbing; confronting it directly and
consistently over time would undoubtedly erode one's faith in
the judiciary as an arbiter of justice. Fortunately, this problem,
while rooted in complex issues of procedure, substance, and
psychology, nevertheless has a workable solution, which is to
ensure that each case receives the full attention of only one fact-
finder.
To the extent that courts accomplish this end, they are said
to have achieved finality, a virtue distinct from any
consideration of the correctness of the substantive outcome.
6. William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist'Movement 382 (Weidenfeld &
Nelson 1973) (commenting on the general acceptance of legal realism with the now-
clich6d phrase: "Realism is dead; we are all realists now"). For a recent review of various
definitions of "realism," see Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a
Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 267, 268, 270 (1997) (contrasting what he
labels the "Core Claim" of realism with the "Received View" that realism is a
"descriptive theory about the nature of judicial decision," which maintains that the
"personal tastes and values" of the decisionmaker matter far more than legal rules in
determining a particular outcome).
7. Stutson v. U.S., 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996) (specifically opining that "Uludicial
efficiency and finality are important values").
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Particularly where civil cases are concerned, empirical evidence
indicates that litigants will accept final outcomes, whether
favorable or not, as long as the? feel they have had some role in
the decisionmaking process. This evidence suggests that
appellate courts confronted with videotaped records may act
wisely in declining to undertake fact-finding tasks such as
evaluating the credibility of witnesses or judging the
persuasiveness of an attorney's argument. While videotaped
records make these tasks feasible for a judge on direct appeal,
they do not necessarily render the use of this capability
appropriate in every situation.
Particularly within a vertical (i.e., direct) system of review,
decisionmaking should be consecutively limited at each
succeeding level not only to minimize costs but also to ensure
that each level of review is meaningful in its own right, rather
than simply a continuous re-presentation of the same argument,
in the hoes that one judge out of several may find it
persuasive. In most routine civil cases, these institutional
concerns of finality and judicial economy should prevail over
any particular litigant's interest in a given outcome. Whether the
record below is on paper or video, therefore, the factual findings
and evidentiary rulings of most trial courts will continue to
deserve and receive appropriate deference.
B. Exercising Deference on Direct Appeal: State Court
Experience with Videotape Records
Several states permit videotaped records, and at least one,
Kentucky, requires no additional written transcript." Complaints
about the videotape procedure generally focus on the quality of
the sound on some tapes, as well as the amount of time required
8. See generally John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A
Psychological Analysis (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., Inc. 1975).
9. See e.g. Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary
Decisionmaking, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 47, 55 n. 31 (2000); Maurice Rosenberg,
Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 650
(1971).
10. See Justice Adele Hedges & Robert Higgason, Videotaped Statements of Facts on
Appeal: Parent of the Thirteenth Juror? 33 Hous. Law. 24, 24 (July/Aug. 1995) (citing
Georgi-Ann Oshagan, Student Author, Videotaped Trial Transcripts and Appellate Review:
Are Some Courts Favoring Form Over Substance? 38 Wayne L. Rev. 1639 (1992)).
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to review lengthy trials." With regard to the standard of review,
at least one state, Ohio, has expressed (in two unpublished
opinions) a willingness to alter, at least slightly, the degree of
deference it grants to trial judges when videotaped testimony is
involved. 2 Other states, such as Tennessee and Washington,
have explicitly rejected attempts to alter the standard of review
accorded to a trial court's factual determinations based on the
availability of videotaped records. 3 Oddly enough, even these
decisions cling to the rhetoric of necessity, noting that video
cameras reveal "only a narrow view of the trial court
proceedings" and do not "preserve the conduct of [all]
participants in the trial," including spectators.14
11. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had this to say about one of Kentucky's
videotape records:
The record is replete with difficulties, not the least of which being its
presentation as a videotape. First, the videotape is marginally audible at times,
particularly when the trial judge and the attorneys whispered their sidebar
conferences and whenever two or more participants spoke at once. Second, we
are not equipped to produce efficiently the written transcription on which careful
review must be founded. Finally, the parties did not have our transcription-
indeed, they seemed not to have any transcription-rendering oral argument
about the events of the trial an exercise in futility. Though we note that
Kentucky's experiment in videotaping trials is receiving praise in the press, we
wish to call attention to the acute difficulties this innovation presents to courts
attempting to fulfill their function of judicial review.
Dorsey v. Parke, 872 F.2d 163, 164-65 (6th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). "Fortunately,"
the court went on to note, "we are able to discern enough of the proceedings at [the
defendant's] trial to rule on his constitutional claim." Id. at 165.
In Alabama, the Court of Civil Appeals complained that it found the videotape
record in one case to be "of very poor quality" and cumbersome in that it "require[d] the
appellate court to view the videotape for the same length of time as was consumed in the
trial itself." Matthews v. Matthews, 659 S.2d 621, 622 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994).
12. See Golias v. Goetz, 1999 WL 528613 at *4 (Ohio App. July 22, 1999) ("There are
occasions when an appellate court need not overly defer to the trial judge, for example
when witnesses are presented by videotape." (emphasis added)); Schlundt v. Wank, 1997
WL 186830 at *5 (Ohio App. Apr. 17, 1997) (reversing the trial court's entry of judgment
and reinstating the jury's verdict, based partly on the court's review of videotaped witness
testimony). Id.
13. See State v. Polnett, 1999 WL 1054697 at *4 n. 17 (Wash. App. Nov. 22, 1999)
(rejecting the appellant's "suggestion that existence of a videotape alters the standard of
review or permits us to give less deference to the court's findings"); Mitchell v. Archibald,
971 S.W.2d 25, 29-30 (Tenn. App. 1998) (declining the appellant's "invit[ation] ... to re-
weigh the evidence and to make [an] independent determination of the witness's credibility
because the official record of the proceedings is in a videotape rather than a written
transcript" ).
14. Polnett, 1999 WL 1054697 at *4 (noting that the court could not detect a "smirk"
from the venireman in question by viewing the videotape of the voir dire-which was
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Because Kentucky requires no written transcript to
accompany a videotape record, its decisions contain the most
relevant information regarding how this technology may change
the nature of appellate review. One article reports that Kentucky
cases decided on the basis of videotape records have no higher
reversal rate than those decided on traditional "cold" records,
and, in fact, may have a higher rate of affirmances.' 5 Comments
from appellate judges in Kentucky varied widely on how the
videotape procedure has affected their job:
"I do not retry the facts. It's not my job."
"I avoid this problem. I guard against it."' 
6
One judge commented that videotape records "reinforce
the trial judge's original determination" and "can bolster the
outcome." "7
Perhaps the most interesting thing about the Kentucky
cases, though, is the way in which videotaped records have
contributed more subtly to the appellate court's analysis. For
example, in one case the appellate court provided the following
detailed description of the trial court's actions in declaring the
evidence closed, in the course of determining that it would not
hold the appellant responsible for its failure to move for a
directed verdict below:
At this point in the video-record, the jury returned to the
courtroom. After greeting the jurors, the judge informed
them that because all housekeeping matters had been
disposed of the previous day, he was prepared to
commence the reading of jury instructions. Counsel for
admittedly positioned "some distance" from the witness stand-but deferring to the trial
judge in any event because he "would have had a better view of such a subtle change in
[the venireman's] expression," and this was "precisely the reason for according great
deference to the judge's findings"); Mitchell, 971 S.W.2d at 29-30 (acknowledging other
considerations, but supporting its refusal to alter the standard of review because
"videotapes of trial proceedings provide only a narrow view of the trial court proceedings"
and do not "record everything going on in the courtroom that the trial court can see,"
meaning that "while the video recording may capture a witness while he or she is
testifying, the recording does not preserve the conduct of other participants in the trial or
even spectators in the courtroom that may be the cause of the witness's demeanor, voice
inflections, or body language").
15. William E. Hewitt, Video Court Reporting: A Primer for Trial and Appellate
Judges, 31 Judges' J. 2, 6, 35 (Winter 1992).
16. Id. at 35.
17 Id
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[defendant] interrupted the judge to remind him that one
remaining piece of evidence had yet to be presented to the
jurors. Realizing he had skipped too far ahead, the judge
allowed [defendant's] counsel to read some medical record
excerpts to the jury.
When [defendant's] counsel finished reading the excerpts
to the jury, the judge again hurriedly declared the evidence
closed and proceeded to instruct the jury. Thus, it appears
the trial judge, in an effort to move the proceedings along
quickly, rushed through the formalities which normally
follow the close of evidence, and in so doing inadvertently
prevented [defendant] from announcing his case was closed
and [plaintiff] from formally moving for a directed verdict.
Although the burden of properly preserving the directed
verdict issue for appellate review was decidedly
[plaintiff/appellant's], and although [plaintiff/appellant]
technically did not move for a directed verdict at the close
of evidence, because of the unique circumstances
surrounding the conclusion of the case at bar, we will
proceed to review the Court of Appeals' analysis and
resolution of the merits of the directed verdict issue.
Surely these subtleties of the court's procedure, including
the "hurried" manner in which the trial judge declared the
evidence to be closed, and the apparent lack of opportunity for
the appellant to interrupt the jury instructions with a directed
verdict motion, would not have appeared on a "cold" record.
We can even imagine the court's language in dismissing this
claim based on a written transcript-invoking the inability to
assess the trial court's demeanor and any non-verbal
communication it may have had with counsel, and conclusively
presuming, in the absence of additional information, that the
appellant had ample opportunity to make its motion. With the
benefit of a videotaped record, however, the court was able to
make a more reasoned and reliable decision, and determine that,
in fact, "unique circumstances" surrounded the conclusion of
the case, and that the appellant should not be penalized for
having failed to move for a directed verdict below.
In another case, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's
determination that a criminal defendant was not unduly
18. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kramer, 987 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. 1999).
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prejudiced by the presence in the courtroom of three deputy
sheriffs. 9 "Having reviewed the record and viewed the
videotape," the court noted that "Appellant was not shackled in
any way, and the guards were not located close to Appellant."20
Additional cases have noted the "body language" of the trial
judge in finding no prejudicial judicial misconduct,2 and
asserted, even in reversing a trial court's determination to jail
the petitioner pending her testimony, that it was "patently clear
from viewing the videotaped record of the proceedings that the
circuit judge was acting in good faith with great concern for the
petitioner's welfare under suspicious and uncertain
conditions."22 In one case, the appellate court actually
commented on a witness's demeanor in reviewing the trial
court's determination that the witness was competent to testify,
noting that "a review of the videotaped hearing... reveals a
polite and rather articulate fifteen year old." Despite this
obvious access to observational evidence, the appellate court
insisted that judging the competency of a witness was a matter
committed to the "sound discretion" of the trial court because
she "is in the unique position to observe witnesses and to
determine their competency." 
2 4
Overall, this experience does reflect the possibility that
appellate courts can make use of the additional information
provided by videotape records, but does not bear out the dire
predictions cast by the court in Moustakas, which warned that
even admitting a videotape of the trial proceeding into the record
on appeal would require such monumental change in appellate
standards of review as to require the involvement of the
legislature or some "higher judicial authority."25 Nor does the
availability of videotaped records in Kentucky appear to have
inspired disgruntled appellants to seek (much less receive) de
novo review of issues such as witness credibility traditionally
reserved for the trial judge. Given this experience, appellate
19. Foley v. Commonwealth, 953 S.W.2d 924, 938-39 (Ky. 1997).
20. Id. at 939.
21. Transit Auth. of River City v. Montgomery, 836 S.w.2d 413, 416 (Ky. 1992).
22. Campbell v. Schroering, 763 S.W.2d 145, 147 n. 4 (Ky. App. 1988).
23. Bart v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Ky. 1997).
24. Id.
25. Moustakas v. Dashevsky, 25 Cal App. 4th 752, 754-55 (Cal. App. 1994).
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courts should be able to approach videotaped records with less
apprehension, recognizing that appellate deference may no
longer be necessary, but certainly remains institutionally
desirable in most direct-review cases.
II. REVIEW OF DEATH PENALTY CASES: A CONTEXT WHERE
SUBSTANTIVE OVERSIGHT IS JUSTIFIED AND MAY EVEN BE
CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED
Since 1976, when the Supreme Court resolved the
ambiguity left by its 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia26 and
endorsed capital punishment as a constitutionally acceptable
penalty for murder," it has come to be expected that every state-
court judgment imposing a sentence of death will be examined
through several layers of judicial review. These post-trial
proceedings almost always include direct appellate review by
the state's highest court, post-conviction review at one or more
levels of the state court system, and finally, habeas corpus
review in federal court. Although the Supreme Court has
observed that the state-court trial must be the "main event" on
the road from indictment to execution,2 s the Court's post-
Furman jurisprudence also emphasizes the important role of
meaningful appellate review in guaranteeing that the death
penalty will not be administered arbitrarily or capriciously.29
Indeed, in capital cases, the search for reliable and accurate
results represents a constitutional mandate. Even as it issued its
qualified endorsement of the newly-minted post-Furman capital
sentencing procedures in Georgia, Florida, and Texas, the Court
announced in the 1976 cases its recognition that the "qualitative
difference" between the penalty of death and all other
punishments creates "a corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
26. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
27. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
28. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994) ("A criminal trial is the 'main event'
at which a defendant's rights are to be determined .... ).
29. E.g. Parker v. Dagger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991) (reversing and remanding death
sentence where the state supreme court mischaracterized the trial judge's findings
regarding the existence of mitigating circumstances).
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punishment in a specific case."3° The Supreme Court has
invoked this principle of "heightened reliability" to justify
special protections in capital cases, including guaranteeing an
African-American defendant accused of an interracial murder
the right to question prospective jurors about their attitudes on
race, despite maintaining that the trial court may refuse to allow
such questioning in a comparable case where the prosecution is
not seeking the death penalty.3'
The same reasoning-that because "death is a different
kind of punishment" it is of "vital importance to the defendant
and to the community that any decision to impose the death
sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than
caprice or emotion "-supports requiring appellate judges who
review capital cases to employ available video technology as an
essential means for subjecting such proceedings to meaningful
scrutiny. Simply put, where the constitution demands that
appellate courts dispose of the cases before them as accurately
as possible-as in death penalty cases-it is necessary that the
courts use all available information in doing so.
What kind of decisions, with the benefit of video review of
trial proceedings, could be made more reliably? Three examples
illustrate areas where greater oversight-such as that now
possible via video technology-would produce more reliable
resolution of critically important federal constitutional issues
30. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
31. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); cf Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976)
(such inquiry not routinely required in non-capital case). It should be acknowledged that
the Court has, on a couple of occasions, hesitated to extend the "heightened reliability"
principle to the post-conviction or habeas corpus stage. E.g. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 390 (1993) (finding no constitutional right for death-sentenced prisoner to raise
freestanding claim of "actual innocence" in federal habeas proceeding); Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (finding no constitutional right to state-appointed counsel
for indigent death-sentenced prisoners seeking state post-conviction relief). However, the
Court has recognized that direct appeals of right generally have become such an accepted
part of the criminal justice system that they trigger the demands of due process. See e.g.
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-57
(1963). In a death penalty case, it would seem appropriate to apply the "heightened
reliability" principle to direct review proceedings, even if not to habeas corpus
proceedings. Cf Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977) (noting, as one reason for
requiring that certain information be included in the trial record, that such a rule will ensure
that the appellate review of the trial court's judgment will advance the constitutional goal
of reducing arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty).
32. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357-58.
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where a defendant's life is at stake: issues arising in jury
selection, errors in closing argument, and claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
A. Juror Selection Issues
The Sixth Amendment right to an unbiased jury limits the
State's power to challenge for cause prospective capital jurors
who harbor reservations about the death penalty.33 From 1968 to
about 1985, the broad enforcement of this constitutional
principle resulted in the reversal of numerous death sentences,
both in state courts and on federal habeas review. However,
over time, reviewing courts (especially federal courts sitting in
habeas corpus) came to apply conventional notions of deference
to trial court findings in this context, with the predictable
consequence that fewer and fewer death sentences were vacated
on this ground. This movement culminated in the Supreme
Court's 1985 decision in Wainwright v. Witt,35 which effectively
immunized such claims from reexamination on federal habeas
corpus by defining the trial court's decision about a particular
juror's qualifications as a finding of fact.36 The Witt Court
33. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 530 (1968). The same principle applies with
equal force to a juror who generally favors the death penalty (i.e., he is legally qualified so
long as his pro-death-penalty views do not "substantially impair" his performance of his
legal duties as a juror). See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1992).
34. This was probably a consequence of the Witherspoon Court's suggestion that the
State could exclude only those individuals who "made unmistakably clear ... that they
would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment." Witherspoon, 391
U.S. at 523 n. 21. According to the Court's reasoning in Witherspoon, the appropriate
remedy for such a violation was a new sentencing proceeding before a constitutionally
assembled jury; the integrity of the defendant's conviction was not affected. Id.
35. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
36. Prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(" AEDPA"), state court decisions resolving questions of law and mixed questions of law
and fact were subject to de novo review in habeas proceedings. See e.g. Dison v. Whitley,
20 F.3d 185, 186 (5th Cir. 1994) (federal habeas court reviews issues of law de novo);
Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 268 (5th Cir. 1993) (mixed questions of law and fact are
reviewed de novo). In contrast, state court findings of fact, entered in writing after a fair
hearing with certain procedural guarantees, were generally presumed correct. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) (former law). Under AEDPA, state court determinations of fact
carry a strong presumption of correctness that can only be overcome by "clear and
convincing" proof, and the statute specifies no conditions precedent for the presumption of
correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (Supp. 1998). With respect tolall other state court
determinations, a federal habeas court may only grant relief if it concludes that the state
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emphasized that deciding whether a prospective juror's views
about the death penalty would render her unable to sit fairly in
judgment required sensitive attention to the juror's manner and
demeanor during her voir dire examination."
In the wake of Witt, post-trial review of claims that a
prospective juror was wrongly excluded on account of his views
about the death penalty has become virtually a dead letter.
However, appellate and post-conviction review of the
videotaped record of voir dire could reanimate this moribund
constitutional guarantee by ensuring that trial judges allow
prospective jurors reasonable latitude in their views regarding
the death penalty, and only disqualify those who are genuinely
"substantially impaired." By empowering appellate and habeas
courts to exercise substantive oversight over the "death
qualification" process, reliance on videotaped voir dire records
could restore some much-needed balance to this part of the
capital trial.
As any honest and experienced capital litigator will
acknowledge, the WitherspoonlWitt regime, in practice, has
tended to result in the exclusion of more anti-death-penalty
jurors than their pro-death-penalty counterparts." This
disproportionate exclusion probably results from the fact that
opposition to the death penalty is often grounded in moral or
religious values, whereas enthusiasm for the death penalty is
court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of Federal
law," or was based on an "unreasonable determination of the facts." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(Supp. 1998); see generally (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, - U.S. -_, 120 S. Ct. 1495,
1518-23 (2000) (opinion of O'Connor, J., for the Court) (explaining how, under AEDPA,
"reasonableness" review supersedes former de novo review).
37. Witt, 469 U.S. at 428.
38. Exclusions on this basis also implicate issues of racial discrimination because
people in minority communities are more likely than those in Anglo communities to
express reservations about the wisdom or morality of capital punishment. E.g. Kirk
Loggins, Poll Finds Race and Gender Affect Death Penalty Views, The Tennessean LA
(Nov. 1, 1999) (poll indicating that 70% of whites favored the death penalty, versus only
39% of blacks); Allan Turner, Some in Jasper Urge 'Eye for an Eye,' Hous. Chron. 1 (Feb,
25, 1999) (noting that "[a] Scripps-Howard Texas Poll earlier this year showed that only
46[%] of blacks [in Texas] endorse the death penalty, compared with 81[%] of whites");
Scripps Howard News Serv., Many Blacks in Poll Back School Prayer, Dallas Morning
News 8A (Apr. 18, 1996) (observing that "[B]lacks are much less willing to support the
death penalty [than other 'tough on crime' measures]. Less than half of those surveyed-48
percent-said they backed capital punishment, compared with 72 of the general
population").
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typically unreflective, the lex talionis notwithstanding. As a
result, although prospective jurors who generally disfavor the
death penalty might well be rehabilitated through careful
questioning by defense counsel, they are likely to be removed
simply because their misgivings about the death penalty emanate
from a deeper source. Yet, including jurors who are cautiously
hesitant to impose the ultimate sentence is essential to ensuring
that the jury's sentencing decision will represent "the
conscience of the community," a key value in having juries
impose sentence in death penalty cases in the first place. Use of
videotaped voir dire records to enable real scrutiny of claimed
Witherspoon error on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings
would promote fairer and more reliable capital trials.
Another area where deferential review has watered down
the defendant's substantive rights is in the protection against the
prosecution's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. In
Batson v. Kentucky,40 the Court appeared to hold out the prospect
that prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges to keep capital
juries all-white would be subjected to real scrutiny. Before long,
however, appellate courts began to retreat from meaningful
examination of the "race-neutral" reasons proffered by
prosecutors in defense of their strikes against minority
venirepersons. The Supreme Court completed this cycle in 1995,
holding that such race-neutral reasons need not even be
"plausible," much less "persuasive," so long as they are
facially race-neutral' With this holding, it appears that Batson,
too, may be little more than a memory.Just as it could revitalize Witherspoon, the use of
39. The Supreme Court has repeatedly employed capital jury sentencing verdicts as an
index of whether society's "evolving standards of decency" permit the death penalty to be
imposed in specific circumstances, or for a specific type of offender. E.g. Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (noting that in making such determinations, the Court
has "[relied] largely on objective evidence such as the judgments of legislatures and
juries").
40. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
41. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam).
42. See e.g. Michelle Mahony, Student Author, The Future Viability of Batson v.
Kentucky and the Practical Implications of Purkett v. Elem, 16 Rev. Litig. 137, 172 (1997)
(" [U]ntil it chooses to reexamine the issue, the Court has jeopardized the practical viability
and effectiveness of Batson in the courtroom."); id. at 171 (noting that of fifty-four
reported federal decisions citing Purkett as of September, 1996, only one resulted in a
reversal on Batson grounds).
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videotaped voir dire records could give new life to Batson. In
particular, that technology would permit the appellate court to
meaningfully test a prosecutor's claim that she struck a
particular juror based on his demeanor (for example, because the
juror somehow nonverbally communicated hostility, disinterest,
sympathy with the defendant, or stupidity)." Without a
videotaped record, such claims are completely insulated from
review on appeal. It is not even possible for the defendant to
demonstrate "clear error" on the trial court's part in accepting
such a justification, since the written record by its very nature
cannot reflect the presence or absence of such attitudes on the
part of the prospective juror. With a videotaped record, however,
the reviewing court could at least monitor whether some
behavior of the juror appeared to be consistent with the
prosecutor's defense.
Video technology would also increase the utility of
"comparative analysis" (that is, considering whether the
prosecutor's failure to exercise strikes against white members of
the venire with similar characteristics reveals a racially
discriminatory motive). A videotaped record of voir dire would
improve "comparative analysis" because the reviewing court
could make much more reliable judgments about whether the
different jurors were genuinely comparable.
History and experience provide an especially strong
justification for employing such technology in the context of
capital cases, where the cruel legacy and continuing influence of
racial discrimination are undeniable.4
43. These are among the most popular purportedly race-neutral reasons proffered by
prosecutors in defense of strikes against prospective jurors of minority race. See e.g. State
v. Martinez, 999 P.2d 795, 800 (Ariz. 2000) (sympathy for defendant); State v. Mukhtaar,
750 A.2d 1059, 1069 (Conn. 2000) (educational background); Jones v. State, 523 S.E.2d
402, 408 (Ga. App. 1999) (sympathy for defendant); Howard v. State, 534 S.E.2d 202 (Ga.
App. 2000) (persons in juror's neighborhood had shown hostility in other cases); People v.
Morales, 719 N.E.2d 261, 268 (I11. App. 1999) ("hostility"); State v. Campbell, 997 P.2d
726, 733 (Kan. 2000) (sympathy for defendant); State v. Hobley, 752 S.2d 771, 783 (La.
1999) ("disinterested"); State v. Johnson, 621 S.2d 1167, 1171 (La. App. 1993)
("disinterested"); Bolton v. State, 752 S.2d 480, 483 (Miss. App. 1999) (educational
background).
44. See e.g. Richard C. Dieter, Death Penalty Information Center, The Death Penalty in
Black and White: Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Decides <http://www.essential.
org/dpic/racerpt.html> (last updated June 1998); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death
And Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35
Santa Clara L. Rev. 433 (1995).
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B. Closing Argument Issues
Few capital cases are reversed for error during closing
argument, at either phase of trial. In part, this is due to the
pernicious influence of Darden v. Wainwright,4" in which the
Supreme Court effectively signaled that it would tolerate
extreme or outrageous conduct by the prosecution in closing
argument, 46 even in capital cases, so long as the argument did
not render the entire trial fundamentally unfair.47  Though
Darden does not compel such an analysis, many appellate courts
take the further step of analyzing complaints about closing
argument on a statement-by-statement basis, rather than
considering the collective harm from repeated improprieties.
Finally, in most jurisdictions, if the trial court sustained an
objection to the improper argument and/or gave a curative
instruction, the presumption of harmlessness on appeal is nearly
conclusive. 4'
45. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
46. The prosecutor in Darden engaged in a series of improprieties, including
characterizing the defendant as an "animal," 477 U.S. at 180 n. 11; arguing that the
Department of Corrections was culpable in having released the defendant, and thus, the
death penalty was the only way to avoid the possibility that he might be released again, see
id. at 180, 180 nn. 9-10; and making emotional pleas that he wished the victim had "blown
[Darden's] face off' and that he could see Darden "sitting here with no face, blown away
by a shotgun," id. at n. 12. After recounting changes in the defendant's appearance
between the time of the offense and trial, the prosecutor told the jury that the only change
in appearance Darden had not made was to "cut his throat." Id.
47. The Court did not reverse because the argument was not deemed sufficiently
egregious to demonstrate a violation of due process, the applicable standard for review of
claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. 477 U.S. at 180 (quoting Donnelly
v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974): "The relevant question is whether the
prosecutor's comments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process."').
48. For example, in a federal habeas action reviewing an Arkansas prosecution for
multiple rapes, Logan v. Lockhart, 994 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1993), the court considered the
petitioner's claim that the prosecutor's misconduct in alluding to a medical examination
not in evidence at trial was so inflammatory that no admonition could have removed the
taint. See id. at 1329-30. Defense counsel's timely objection had been sustained by the trial
court, but counsel did not request further relief either in the form of admonition or mistrial.
See id. at 1330. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the prosecutor's argument was "highly
improper." Id. However, the court observed:
Defense counsel's failure to seek a corrective instruction or to move for mistrial
is, however, critical to our conclusion that Petitioner was not denied due process
by the prosecutor's objectionable comments. While we think the comments at
issue were likely injurious, we are unwilling to say that the trial judge was
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Trial lawyers feel acutely the unfairness of such legal
presumptions, because they understand how inadequately a
"cold" record may reflect the dynamics of closing argument,
especially at the penalty phase where the defendant's life is at
stake. For several different reasons, the availability of video
records will improve the accuracy of appellate courts in
reviewing such claims of error.
First, appreciating the emotional pitch of closing argument
is essential to assessing the real impact of a particular improper
line of argument. Because prosecution witnesses, even members
of the victim's family, generally are not permitted to offer a
direct opinion about what sentence the defendant should receive,
closing argument presents the only opportunity for the
prosecutor to articulate her demand that the jury impose death
and to attempt to impart the necessary emotional momentum to
carry the jury through its task.49 It is tempting to cross the line
that separates "hard blows" from foul ones, and many
prosecutors do so in response to the need to motivate the jurors
to vote for death. It is too easy for a reviewing court, faced with
a prosecutor whose penalty-phase closing argument
characterized the defendant as "deviate," "cold,' ".mean,"
"twisted," "callused," "cold-blooded," "depraved," and
"malignant" to conclude in the abstract that these descriptions
constitutionally required to admonish the jury absent a request from defense
counsel. We therefore find no constitutional error.
Id.
Typically, appellate courts will hold that the remedy of mistrial is only appropriate
when a curative instruction or admonition would be inadequate to cure the prejudice
resulting from improper closing argument. Holbird v. State, 775 S.W.2d 893 (Ark. 1989).
When trial courts do give curative instructions on request by counsel, appellate courts
generally find the corrective measures adequate to defuse the prejudice. See e.g. Dandridge
v. State, 727 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Ark. 1987) (prosecutor's reference to the accused as a
"gross animal" was deemed cured by the trial court's admonition to jurors to disregard the
remark); King v. State, 877 S.W.2d 583, 585-86 (Ark. 1994) (prosecutor's argument that
jurors should consider their neighbors' children, their own children and grandchildren in
child sexual assault prosecution, a violation of the prohibition against the "golden rule"
argument, was properly addressed by trial court's admonition that jurors were not to place
themselves in the position of the victim).
49. Numerous studies indicate that, despite supposed popular enthusiasm for the death
penalty, it remains extremely traumatic and difficult for anyone to choose deliberately to
end the life of another human being. Jurors thus must be subjected to certain time-tested
psychological techniques in order to overcome this ingrained reluctance to kill. See
generally Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of
Learning to Kill in War and Society (Little, Brown & Co. 1995).
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did not render the entire proceeding "fundamentally unfair"
within the meaning of that phrase in Darden. But it is difficult to
imagine any fair-minded judge-after watching and listening to
these increasingly passionate arguments, gradually rising to the
final thundering crescendo that "the defendant is a man who
deserves to die, and I dare say that when his appointed day and
hour arrives, you can put your ear down to Mother Earth and
hear the gates of hell clang shut on his murderous soul"-
concluding that the defendant had a fair penalty hearing.5 °
In addition to giving reviewing courts an accurate
appreciation of the emotional context of the closing arguments, a
video record can also show how events in the courtroom
unfolded during argument-whether, for example, the
prosecutor employed gestures or movements that, in
combination with the words of the argument itself, created
unfair prejudice against the defendant. In one Texas case
involving the murder of a state trooper, the prosecutor's penalty-
phase closing argument contained references easily interpreted
as directing the jurors' attention to the twenty uniformed
troopers seated in the courtroom audience, and as demanding
that the jurors be mindful of the troopers' wants and needs in
determining sentence. He asked repeatedly for the jury to give
the death penalty "on behalf of law enforcement," once adding,
"You know, I tell my people-and they're still here and I'm proud
of them for coming over-I tell them, 'Look, guys, society's a
jungle out there and the only thing that separates us from the
criminals is the police.' And I tell my officers, 'You guys may be
broke as the Ten Commandments but you're the last strand
between the fox and the chicken."' He reminded the jury that its
verdict would "tell law enforcement what you think about it."
Finally, after telling a parable about how one could "make a
difference" by returning beached starfish to the sea: "You can
also make a difference to [the deceased trooper], who gave his life
trying to protect us. Yes, to that starfish and to these starfish you
50. Remarks from prosecutor's penalty-phase closing argument in Trial Tr. vol. IV,
1236-1237, in State v. Barber, No. F80-6421-LJ (Tex. Crim. Ct. 3d Dist. 1980). Barber's
conviction and sentence of death were affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
757 S.W.2d 359 (1988). The issue of impropriety in the final argument was not addressed
in the published opinion, not having been raised by counsel on direct appeal. Barber has
since been executed.
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do make a difference." The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
reviewing the cold record, expressed uncertainty as to how many
officers were present and whether the prosecutor's argument was
intended to direct the jurors' attention to them, and, in the face of
that doubt, was unwilling to find that the defendant's rights had
been violated.5' A videotaped record could have made plain that
the prosecutor was invoking the presence of the uniformed officers
as an integral part of his demand that the jury impose the death
penalty.
In addition, videotaped records would make it possible to
resolve meaningfully the occasional disputes that arise
concerning how statements by the court or counsel were
inflected or intoned, and what significance such nuances carry.
During closing arguments in another Texas death penalty trial,
the prosecutor admonished jurors that "even if somebody
voluntarily took drugs or voluntarily became intoxicated," such
actions did not "excuse [the crime or] lessen the punishment."
Defense counsel promptly objected that the prosecutor's remark
implied "that they cannot consider that as a mitigating factor
when, in fact, that is the law." The trial court responded, "Of
course what he says is true, but the Jury may consider that as a
mitigating factor if they wish." The prosecutor then said,
"Thank you, your Honor," leading defense counsel to ask, "Is
my objection overruled?" The court responded in the
affirmative: "Yes, it is overruled."
Exactly how the jury understood this tangled exchange is
unclear: Who was the "he" whose view, according to the trial
court, was "true?" One obvious interpretation is that the
prosecutor's complaint that voluntary intoxication was not a
mitigating circumstance as a matter of law was endorsed by the
trial judge (because defense counsel's objection was overruled).
Indeed, any other interpretation makes incoherent the trial
judge's use of "but" to introduce the clause "the Jury may
consider that ..... " A competing, though less plausible,
possibility is that the jury perceived that the triil court overruled
51. Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 117-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc); see
also Powell v. State, 897 S.W.2d 307, 317 n. 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (noting, but not
reaching, the appellant's complaint that the presence of "about eighty-five uniformed and
armed police officers" in the courtroom during penalty-phase closing arguments, in a case
involving the murder of a police officer, created a "lynch-mob atmosphere").
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defense counsel's objection because the prosecutor's original
argument was properly understood as directed to the evidence,
not the law. The bottom line is that the interpretation of this
exchange was pivotal to the integrity of the defendant's death
sentence, and it was impossible to reach a reliable conclusion
about the meaning of these comments in the absence of a
videotaped record. It is not uncommon for cold records to
present similar disputes, disputes that would disappear if the
court had access to the participants' inflections, intonations,
gestures, and so on."
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ineffective assistance of counsel is one of the most
frequently raised arguments in federal petitions for habeas
corpus, but one that rarely results in the reversal of the
underlying sentence or conviction.53 Despite the growing
recognition that court-appointed lawyers often lack the
experience and funding necessary to properly investigate,
54research, and try death penalty cases, courts continue to prove
52. This exchange appears in Trial Tr. vol. XV, 467, in the trial record of State v.
Johnson, tried in the 132nd District Court of Scurry County, Texas, in 1986. Johnson's
conviction and sentence of death were affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in
Johnson v. State, 773 S.W.2d 322 (1989). Ironically, Johnson's death sentence was upheld
on direct appeal by a 5-4 vote of the Supreme Court, after the majority concluded that the
penalty-phase jury charge was sufficient to permit consideration of mitigating evidence.
See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993). Given the character of the prosecutor's closing
argument, one must gravely doubt whether the jurors in fact understood their Eighth
Amendment obligation to consider all evidence in mitigation as part of determining
whether a death sentence was warranted. Johnson was executed in 1997.
53. Anne M. Voigts, Student Author, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural
Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 Colum. L.
Rev. 1103, 1118 (1999).
54. See generally Bright, supra n. 44, and sources cited therein; see also Raymond
Bonner & Sara Rimer, A Closer Look at Five Cases That Resulted in Executions of Texas
Inmates, N.Y. Times (May 14, 2000) (detailing various instances in which trial counsel's
inadequate experience and lack of funding for necessary investigators contributed to the
conviction and execution of several Texas prisoners); Sara Rimer & Raymond Bonner, On
The Record: Capital Punishment in Texas; Bush Candidacy Puts Focus on Executions,
N.Y. Times (May 14, 2000) (noting that Charles Baird, a former judge of the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, "along with other judges, law enforcement officials and death penalty
lawyers, agrees that some of the conditions that have created doubt elsewhere and have
sent innocen/t people to death row in other states--especially bad lawyers, a lack of
resources for lawyers to mount a vigorous defense and overzealous prosecutors-exist in
abundance in Texas"). Although Texas is receiving most of the current media attention due
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reluctant to address even the most egregious breaches of
professional norms."
In part, this lack of oversight results from the fact-intensive
nature of ineffective assistance claims. Under Strickland v.
56Washington, a convicted defendant must prove not only that his
counsel's performance was deficient, but also that this deficient
performance prejudiced his case. With nothing but a cold record
on which to judge counsel's performance, as well as the trial as
a whole, federal courts defer first to the lawyer in assessing
whether her performance was deficient, and second to the judge
who witnessed the trial in determining whether any deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant.57 In either case, this
to the upcoming election, death penalty procedures in other states suffer similar problems.
See e.g. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, The Failure of the Death Penalty in Illinois, Chi.
Tribune 1 (Nov. 14-18, 1999) (five-part series describing various problems with Illinois's
death penalty regime, which later contributed to governor's decision to impose a
moratorium on executions in that state).
55. For a review of some of the most appalling facts, see Stephen B. Bright, Counsel
for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime But for the Worst Lawyer, 103
Yale L.J. 1835, 1857-61 (1994), noting numerous cases in which courts have refused to
find counsel ineffective despite proof that counsel was addicted to drugs while "preparing"
for trial, that counsel failed to investigate and/or present any mitigating evidence at the
penalty phase, and that counsel forfeited claims of constitutional error that admittedly
could have spared the defendant's life on appeal. In one case described by Bright, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas based on ineffective assistance because
counsel's four-sentence closing "argument" at the penalty phase was a "dramatic ploy"
which, "[h]ad the jury returned a life sentence ... might well have been seen as a brilliant
move." Id. at 1858-59 (discussing Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 875, 877 (5th Cir.
1989), in which the court noted that the counsel's closing consisted entirely of "You are an
extremely intelligent jury. You've got that man's life in your hands. You can take it or not.
That's all I have to say.").
In some circuits, it is not even clear that counsel's sleeping through portions of a trial
will meet the Strickland standard. E.g. Prada-Cordero v. U.S., 95 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81-82
(D.P.R. 2000) (noting relevant decisions from the Ninth and Second Circuits, but
cautioning that a sleeping attorney should not lead courts to presume that a defendant was
prejudiced because (1) "it may not be unusual" for attorneys to sleep during trial; (2)
attorneys might pretend to be asleep as a "strategic tool"; and (3) "unscrupulous
practitioners," aware of a presumption of prejudice based on sleep, might sleep during trial
solely in order to provide their clients with an argument for a new trial).
56. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
57. See U.S. v. Luciano, 158 F.3d 655, 660 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[T]he conduct of
examination and cross-examination is entrusted to the judgment of the lawyer, and an
appellate court on a cold record should not second-guess such decisions unless there is no
strategic or tactical justification for the course taken."); see also Hernandez v. Senkowski,
1999 WL 1495443 at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1999) (disposing of a claim of ineffective
assistance based on failure to introduce certain recorded statements by noting that "defense
counsel, who had the opportunity to assess the demeanor and credibility of the various
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deference goes beyond traditional notions of crediting the court
below, and serves largely to insulate counsel's performance
from any independent review, at either the district or circuit
court level.
For example, when the state of Georgia tried James Messer
for capital murder, his court-appointed attorney made no
opening statement, presented no case-in-chief, objected to none
of the fifty-three items of evidence offered by the State, failed to
cross examine fourteen of the state's twenty-three witnesses and
conducted only cursory cross-examination of the other nine. 8
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, addressing Messer's
conviction on federal habeas, concluded that these "statistical
observations" did not establish deficient performance, much less
the prejudice required by Strickland.9 Even on a cold record, at
least two United States Supreme Court justices found Messer's
representation "egregiously unprofessional" and "piteously
deficient," 6° but Georgia executed Messer in July 1988. Of
course, the fact that the appellate court found only "statistics"
on which to base its decision is a situation not entirely within
Messer's control. Without the benefit of a videotaped record,
appellate courts admittedly have difficulty evaluating qualitative
claims of error. As one court noted in denying one ineffective
assistance claim, partially because counsel had died since trial
and so was unable to testify about the representation,
"Reviewing courts are left only with the cold record and
[appellant's] assertions." 61
In assessing whether particular conduct "prejudiced" the
defendant, appellate courts suffer from a similar lack of
information. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
witnesses, was in the best position to assess whether the introduction of the [evidence]
would assist or harm the petitioner's defense"); May v. Collins, 955 F.2d 299, 314 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that the state court's adjudication of an ineffective assistance claim should
be presumed correct despite the fact that no evidentiary hearing was held because "the
judge did not have to make this decision on the cold record alone; rather, he could compare
the information presented in the various affidavits against his own firsthand knowledge of
the trial").
58. Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1089 (11 th Cir. 1985).
59. Id. at 1089-90.
60. Messer v. Kemp, 474 U.S. 1088, 1088-89 (1986) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
61. Crowe v. South Dakota, 484 F.2d 1359, 1361 (8th Cir. 1973) (brackets in original)
(quoting Crowe v. South Dakota, 356 F. Supp. 777, 778 (D.S.D. 1973)).
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repeatedly endorsed the practice of some state courts of
resolving ineffective assistance claims solely on the basis of
affidavits rather than live testimony, in part because state judges
ruling on habeas claims are often the same judges who presided
over the original trial.62 In the Fifth Circuit's view, this
familiarity lends added credibility, because at least the judge can
"compare the information presented in the various affidavits
against his own firsthand knowledge of the trial." 63 A more
reliable approach, however, would involve at least an
independent review of counsel's conduct at trial, preferably
conducted by a court with no stake in justifying the original
outcome. With the benefit of videotaped trial records, such
independent review could become a reality, at least for future
death row inmates.
III. CONCLUSION
In each of these different areas, videotaped records
challenge the necessity of deferring to a trial court's first-hand
observations. In most garden-variety appeals, however,
deference by a reviewing court to trial court determinations may
be justified by policy values other than necessity, such as
finality and judicial economy. No technological advance is
likely to endanger traditional standards of review in that context.
In less than routine cases, however, such as when a
defendant's life is at stake, videotaped records may provide
some opportunity for much-needed improvement in appellate
oversight of state court proceedings. Certainly some judges may
balk at the idea of increasing the scrutiny they currently give to
state court death cases, particularly in light of Congress's
apparent bent in the opposite direction. But no law forbids, and,
indeed, common sense and common decency demand, that
before the judiciary authorizes an execution, it should hear the
protests of the condemned in full, and accept or reject those
claims based on the most accurate information possible. Because
videotaped records provide one way in which to preserve this
crucial information, and thereby improve the accuracy of
62. May, 955 F.2d at 314.
63. Id.
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appellate and post-conviction review, appellate courts should
welcome their introduction. In so doing, the courts should
acknowledge that the policy of deference in the death-penalty
context should yield to the imperative of correcting
fundamentally unfair judgments.
